CLEAN - LSE SEMINAR -  Romain Ferrali (Aix Marseille School of Economics)

The next CLEAN seminar, in collaboration with LSE, will take place on March 5th 2025 from 4-5PM CET online.

Romain Ferrali (Aix Marseille School of Economics) will be presenting his paper.
 

Abstract 

Corruption is often a collective endeavor involving both politicians and bureaucrats, yet most research on anti-corruption policies focuses on disciplining politicians. We examine how audits affect bureaucrats using a randomized audit program of Brazilian municipalities. We establish that audits effectively punish corrupt bureaucrats: they increase dismissals and resignations, with effects concentrated among likely patronage hires. Leveraging a theoretical framework that views mayors as bureaucratic supervisors, we show that the mayor's decision to dismiss is driven by legal rather than electoral accountability concerns. Using structural estimates, we find that bureaucrats' decision to resign results from reduced rent-seeking opportunities rather than fear of dismissal. Our findings have implications for the design of anti-corruption policies and suggest that while patronage appointments come with rents, they are also exposed to greater punishment
 

You may follow the event online via Zoom Meetings at the following link: https://unibocconi-it.zoom.us/j/95156174209?pwd=wXEpcuO3NvMY4wKbMZJxdbd4MXbThO.1 - Meeting ID: 951 5617 4209 - Passcode: 380323